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Evidentiality and temporal distance learning∗
Todor Koev
Rutgers University
Abstract The grammatical category of evidentiality is traditionally defined as
marking evidence type or related concepts (Anderson 1986, Willett 1988, Aikhenvald
2004). I argue against this received view as I show that evidential morphemes in
Bulgarian mark the temporal distance between the time at which the speaker learned
the described proposition and the topic time. I also demonstrate that Bulgarian
evidentials represent projective/backgrounded content that is informative but does
not affect the described proposition, which is plainly entailed. The latter fact
especially has important typological and theoretical consequences. The proposal is
formalized in a logic that extends Dynamic Predicate Logic by adding propositional
variables (cf. AnderBois et al. 2010).
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1 Introduction
The Bulgarian language exhibits a morphological distinction between direct and
indirect evidential marking, as illustrated in (1)-(3) below. Sentences with indirect
evidentials show a further morphological variation when occurring in the third person
(singular or plural): a reduced and a full present perfect form. The reduced form
lacks an auxiliary and typically gives rise to reportative readings (2). The full form
includes the auxiliary and typically receives inferential interpretations (3).1
(1) Ivan
Ivan
celu-n-a-Ø
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-DIR
Maria.
Maria
∗ Special thanks to Maria Bittner, Anthony Gillies, and Roger Schwarzschild for directing the research
on the following paper and to Veneeta Dayal and Jimmy Bruno for numerous improvements on
the final draft. I would like to also thank Daniel Altshuler, Dimka Atanassov, Mark Baker, Erik
Hoversten, Michael Johnson, Chris Kennedy, Ezra Keshet, Sarrah Murray, Carlotta Pavese, Ken
Safir, Yael Sharvit, Will Starr, Matthew Stone, Anna Szabolcsi, and two anonymous reviewers for
stimulating discussion.
1 In the glosses the following abbreviations are used: 1/2/3 = first/second/third person, DEF = definite
article, DIR = direct evidential, FEM = feminine, FUT = future, IND = indirect evidential, NEG =
negation, NEUT = neuter, PFV = perfective, PL = plural, PRES = present, PRT = particle, PST = past,
SG = singular.
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‘(I saw that) Ivan kissed Maria.’
(2) Ivan
Ivan
celu-n-a-l
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-IND
Maria.
Maria
‘(I was told that) Ivan kissed Maria.’
(3) Ivan
Ivan
e
be.3SG.PRES
celu-n-a-l
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-IND
Maria.
Maria
‘(I infer that) Ivan kissed Maria.’
In this paper I focus on the meaning contrast in (1)-(2).2 More generally, I
discuss the direct evidential, a null verbal suffix represented as -Ø (DIR), and the
indirect evidential, the -l (IND) verbal suffix, when it occurs in the reduced present
perfect form.
The rough intuition, reflected in the preliminary translations above, is that DIR
signals direct perceptual evidence for the described event whereas IND signals
indirect (i.e. reportative or inferential) evidence for the described event. Below, I
demonstrate that this intuition is not entirely accurate. Instead, I argue for a temporal
account according to which Bulgarian evidentials impose restrictions on the time
frame during which the expressed proposition was learned by the speaker.
The proposal has three parts. First, it is argued that Bulgarian sentences with
evidentials entail their scope proposition.3 For example, both (1) and (2) entail that
Ivan kissed Maria. This is different from other evidential systems in which indirect
evidentials do affect the scope proposition, e.g. by making a modal claim about
it (as in St’át’imcets’; see Matthewson et al. 2007) or by simply presenting it (as
in Cuzco Quechua; see Faller 2002). Second, I propose that Bulgarian evidentials
represent projective meanings that constitute backgrounded assertions. For example,
the evidential contribution of IND in (2) cannot take scope under truth-conditional
operators and is not part of the main point of the utterance. This goes against the
widespread claim that evidentials in Bulgarian (as well as other languages) contribute
presuppositions of evidence type (see Izvorski 1997 and Sauerland & Schenner
2007). Finally, I argue that Bulgarian evidentials are ‘secondary tense’ morphemes
which express a temporal relation between a past learning event/secondary ‘now’ and
the topic time. More precisely, I claim that DIR (secondary non-past) indicates that
the speaker learned the scope proposition before or during the topic time whereas
IND (secondary past) signals that the speaker learned the scope proposition after
the topic time. For example, during a discussion about the party last night, uttering
2 I leave the analysis of the full present perfect form for further research. Ideally, the inferential
readings should be compositionally derived from the independently motivated meanings of IND and
the present auxiliary.
3 The ‘scope proposition’ is the proposition expressed by the non-evidential part of the sentence. I
adopt this terminology from Murray (2010).
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(1) would imply that the speaker learned that Ivan kissed Maria during the party
whereas (2) would imply that the speaker learned that Ivan kissed Maria after the
party was over. The temporal part of the proposal does away with ‘evidence type’ as
a primitive notion and puts Bulgarian evidentials in line with temporal evidentials
in other languages (see Nikolaeva 1999, Aikhenvald 2004, Fleck 2007, Lee 2008,
Speas 2010).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the strength of the
scope proposition in sentences with evidentials. Section 3 analyzes the status of
the evidential meaning. The temporal account is developed in Section 4. Section 5
provides a formal implementation. In Section 6, the account is tentatively extended
to sentences in non-past tenses. Section 7 concludes and discusses some broader
implications of the proposal.
2 The status of the scope proposition
In this section I argue that Bulgarian sentences with (indirect) evidentials entail the
scope proposition. The intuition that indirect evidentials in some languages do not
affect the scope proposition has already been discussed elsewhere in the literature;
see Nikolaeva (1999) for Northern Ostyak, Garrett (2001) for Tibetan, Sauerland
& Schenner (2007) for Bulgarian, and Lim (2010) for Korean. However, the idea
has not been given enough emphasis and its theoretical and typological implications
have not been further explored.
Izvorski (1997) famously analyzed the Bulgarian indirect evidential as an epis-
temic necessity modal which also carries the presupposition of indirect evidence
type.4 According to this view, the sentence in (2) above asserts that Ivan must have
kissed Maria and presupposes that the speaker has indirect evidence for her asser-
tion. On fairly standard assumptions about the semantics of necessity modals (e.g.
Kratzer 1991), this would imply that a speaker uttering a sentence with IND considers
the scope proposition to be highly likely but the speaker is not fully committed to
its truth. To argue against this view, I will compare the epistemic uses of trjabva
‘must’/‘should’, the only necessity modal in Bulgarian, to IND and demonstrate that
only the latter entails the proposition in its scope.
The first piece of evidence comes from modal subordination (see Roberts 1989).
Indefinite objects in the scope of trjabva are not entailed and cannot be referred to
anaphorically from outside the modal environment. In contrast, indefinite objects
in the scope of IND are entailed and can be freely referred to in later discourse. For
example, (4a)+(4c) cannot be uttered about someone who I have strong reasons to
believe is Ivan’s girlfriend and with whom I had coffee yesterday. In contrast, if Ivan
4 See Faller (2006), Faller (2011), McCready & Ogata (2007), Matthewson et al. (2007), Lee (2008),
Matthewson (2010), and Peterson (2010) for modal accounts of indirect evidentials in other languages.
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introduced his new girlfriend to me and I had coffee with her, (4b)+(4c) would be
fully acceptable as a way to report what happened yesterday.5
(4) a. Ivan
Ivan
trjabva-Ø
must-DIR
da
PRT
ima
have
nova
new
prijatelka.
girlfriend
‘Ivan must have a new girlfriend.’
b. Ivan
Ivan
ima-l
have-IND
nova
new
prijatelka.
girlfriend
‘Ivan has a new girlfriend, as I learned later.’
c. Vcˇera
yesterday
pix-me-Ø
drink-1PL.PST-DIR
kafe
coffee
s
with
neja.
her
‘Yesterday we had coffee together.’
Another piece of evidence comes from the relative ease with which the scope
proposition can be denied or doubted by the speaker. There are contexts in which
the scope proposition (also known as the ‘prejacent’) of necessity modals can be
explicitly denied by the speaker. However, in similar contexts it is not possible for
the speaker to deny the scope proposition of evidentials. Imagine that the barometer
is showing the highest possible chance of rain but the speaker checks the weather
outside and finds no trace of rain. She could report this by uttering (5a). Now
consider another situation: the speaker is informed on the phone that it is raining
outside but she also looks through the window and sees the bright sunshine. It would
not be acceptable for her to report this situation by uttering (5b).
(5) a. V
in
moment-a
moment-DEF
trjabva-Ø
must-DIR
da
PRT
val-i,
rain-3SG
no
but
ne
NEG
val-i-Ø.
rain-3SG-DIR
‘It should be raining right now, but it isn’t raining.’
b. #V
in
moment-a
moment-DEF
val-ja-l-o,
rain-3SG-IND-NEUT
no
but
ne
NEG
val-i-Ø.
rain-3SG-DIR
Similar judgments are obtained with weaker denials, e.g. by adding maj ‘it seems’
to the second conjunct in (5a)-(5b).
The fact that IND does not trigger modal subordination effects and that its scope
cannot be denied or doubted by the speaker are straightforwardly explained by the
assumption that sentences with IND plainly entail the scope proposition. From this it
seems to follow that IND is not a modal element. However, one might object that
the same facts would also follow if IND were a necessity modal, albeit a strong
one. Von Fintel & Gillies (2010) argue that English sentences with must, a strong
5 Henceforth, I use translations that better reflect the current account.
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necessity modal, do entail the scope proposition. Thus, if trjabva is a weak necessity
modal but IND is a strong necessity modal, the contrast in strength between the two
elements would follow.
To show that IND is not a (strong) necessity modal, I compare its behavior
in contexts in which it strengthens a previously made modal claim. One could
distinguish between ‘modal strengthening’, i.e. a strengthening from a weaker to
a stronger modal claim, and ‘absolute strengthening’, i.e. a strengthening from a
modal claim to the plain assertion. (6a) is a case of modal strengthening and (6b)
is a case of absolute strengthening. What is important is that the adverbs signaling
the shift in degree of certainty differ in the two cases: vsyštnost ‘in fact’ in (6a) vs.
naistina ‘indeed’ in (6b). Crucially, when a sentence with trjabva is strengthened to
a sentence with IND, naistina is strongly preferred, indicating that (6c) is a case of
absolute strengthening, not of modal strengthening.
(6) a. Dnes
today
može-Ø
might-DIR
da
PRT
val-i.
rain-3SG
Vsyštnost
in.fact
/
/
#I
and
naistina,
indeed
dnes
today
trjabva-Ø
must-DIR
da
PRT
val-i.
rain-3SG
‘It could rain today. In fact, it must rain today.’
b. Dnes
today
trjabva-še-Ø
might-DIR
da
PRT
val-i.
rain-3SG
??Vsyštnost
in.fact
/
/
I
and
naistina,
indeed
dnes
today
val-ja-Ø.
rain-3SG.PST-DIR
‘It should have rained today. And indeed, it rained.’
c. Dnes
today
trjabva-še-Ø
might-DIR
da
PRT
val-i.
rain-3SG
??Vsyštnost
in.fact
/
/
I
and
naistina,
indeed
dnes
today
val-ja-l-o.
rain-3SG-IND-NEUT
‘It should have rained today. And indeed, it rained, as I learned later.’
I conclude that Bulgarian sentences with indirect (as well as direct) evidentials
plainly entail the scope proposition. If this is on the right track, it would argue against
Bulgarian evidentials being either of the two more familiar types of evidentials:
modal-like evidentials (e.g. ku7 in St’át’imcets’; see Matthewson et al. 2007) or
illocutionary-like evidentials (e.g. -si in Cuzco Quechua; see Faller 2002).6
It should be emphasized that a sentence with IND does not always entail the
scope proposition. The speaker has various tools at her disposal in case she chooses
6 The names ‘modal-like’ and ‘illocutionary-like’ evidentials are not meant to imply a particular
analysis but are rather a descriptive way of referring to evidentials with different degree of the
speaker’s commitment to the scope proposition.
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to make a weaker claim: e.g. she could add extra intonation indicating uncertainty or
disbelief, use the dubitative mood,7 or include adverbs like už ‘allegedly’. Either of
those strategies would make, say, the sentence in (5b) felicitous. However, with the
exception of the dubitative mood, such weakening strategies are independent of the
evidentiality system and are also found in languages without grammatical evidential
marking, including English.
3 The evidential import as projective/backgrounded content
In this section I argue that Bulgarian evidentials represent projective meanings that
constitute backgrounded assertions. The idea that the evidential signal is in some
sense ‘secondary’ to the main assertion has been hinted at elsewhere in the literature
(see Anderson 1986 and Nikolaeva 1999) and has been given a full-blown defense in
Murray (2010). (See also Lim 2010, who analyzes the evidential signal as, roughly,
an informative presupposition.)
‘Projection’ and ‘backgroundedness’ are two closely related but distinct con-
cepts. Projection is the semantic property of not being able to be interpreted in the
scope of truth-conditional operators. This property is typically a matter of gram-
matical status, i.e. of having a particular lexical meaning or exhibiting a particular
syntactic structure. Backgroundedness (often referred to as being ‘not at-issue’) is
the pragmatic property of not being part of the main point of the utterance. This
property is a matter of lacking salience in discourse. The prime example fitting
both concepts is that of presupposition. More recently though, researchers have
focused on a large class of meanings that both project and are backgrounded but do
not contribute (classical) presuppositions, incl. appositives, expressive adjectives,
and honorifics (see Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990, Potts 2005, Simons et al.
2010). Following up on Murray (2010), I argue that Bulgarian evidentials are both
projective and backgrounded content that is not presuppositional.
I first discuss the projective nature of Bulgarian evidentials. It is easy to notice
that IND cannot take scope under truth-conditional operators like negation. In (7)
the negation cannot take scope over the evidential import but only over the regular
assertive content.
(7) Ivan
Ivan
ne
NEG
celu-n-a-l
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-IND
Maria.
Maria
‘Ivan didn’t kiss Maria, as I learned later.’
NOT: ‘I didn’t learn that Ivan kissed Maria.’
7 The dubitative mood in Bulgarian has the full present perfect morphology but also marks the auxiliary
with the indirect evidential.
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Data like these have led researchers to assume that the indirect evidential contributes
presuppositional content (e.g. Izvorski 1997, Sauerland & Schenner 2007). However,
the projective behavior of IND seems to differ from that of classical presuppositions.
Ever since Karttunen (1973) it has been known that classical presuppositions are
‘plugged’ when asserted in conditional antecedents, as in ‘If Jack has children, then
all of Jack’s children are bald’ or when occurring under verbs of saying, as in ‘Jack
said that Fred kissed Cecilia again’. Unfortunately, the reduced present perfect form
of IND cannot occur in conditional antecedents. But it can occur under verbs of
saying and in such cases the evidential almost always retains its speaker-orientation
(see Sauerland & Schenner 2007). Imagine that Maria sees Todor’s hair and tells the
speaker that Todor has red hair. Since the speaker only has reportative evidence, she
would preferably utter (8), marked with IND in the embedded clause. Compare this
to a situation in which Milena sees Todor’s hair and tells Maria that Todor has red
hair. Maria reports this to the speaker, who however has already seen Todor’s red
hair. In such a situation the embedded clause needs to be marked by DIR.8 9
(8) Maria
Maria
kaz-a-Ø
say-3SG.PST-DIR
cˇe
that
Todor
Todor
ima-Ø
have-DIR
/
/
ima-l
have-IND
cˇervena
red
kosa.
hair
‘Maria said that Todor has red hair.’ (Sauerland & Schenner 2007)
Such data suggest that IND represents projective meaning that is not presupposi-
tional.10
Next, I discuss the backgrounded nature of Bulgarian evidentials. A hallmark
of backgrounded content is the fact that its truth cannot be directly challenged in
subsequent discourse. Content contributed by indirect evidentials passes this test
for backgroundedness. For example, (9) below cannot be offered as a reply to (2),
translated as ‘Ivan kissed Maria, as I learned later’.
(9) Tova
this
ne
NEG
e-Ø
be.3SG.PRES-DIR
vjarno.
true
Ti
you
go
it
na-ucˇ-i-Ø
PFV-learn-3SG-DIR
ošte
already
togava.
then
‘That’s not true. You learned it already at that time.’
8 In this latter case the speaker has both direct and indirect evidence for the embedded clause. It is not
immediately clear why DIR is preferred over IND in such contexts.
9 Neither version of (8) would be used if the speaker disbelieves the embedded proposition. In the
latter case only the dubitative mood seems possible. (I thank Chris Kennedy and Sarah Murray for
bringing up this point.)
10 One notable exception to the speaker-orientation of evidentials is the so-called ‘interrogative flip’
(Garrett 2001, Lim 2010, Murray 2010). In questions, evidentials presuppose that the hearer has the
relevant information to answer the question.
121
Todor Koev
Evidentials share the property of being backgrounded with presuppositions. How-
ever, there are at least two important ways in which evidentials differ from pre-
suppositions. First, as Faller (2002) points out, the information contributed by
evidentials is discourse-new, whereas the information contributed by presuppositions
is discourse-old. Presuppositions can only exceptionally present new information,
a move that is accompanied by a special discourse effect, that of accommodation.
To say that evidentials are presuppositions that typically accommodate would be
to make the exception the rule. Second, Lim (2010) observes that presuppositional
implications which are not met have a different semantic impact than evidential
implications which do not hold. When presuppositional implications are false, the
intuition is that the discourse has become defective and needs to be repaired. In
contrast, when the wrong evidential is used, the intuition is not that the sentence is
infelicitous but rather that the speaker is lying or being deceitful. Given these two
general considerations, I tentatively assume that Bulgarian evidentials contribute
projective/backgrounded content that is not presuppositional.11
Both the fact that the scope proposition is entailed, argued in Section 2, and that
the evidential contribution projects/is backgrounded, argued in the current section,
are captured in the formal part of the proposal by separating the meaning impact
of regular assertive content from that of evidentials. Regular assertive content is
predicated of the topical worlds that are currently under discussion and will affect
the context set only if accepted by the speech participants. This holds whether or
not the particular language has evidential marking. In contrast, evidential content
directly updates the current context set and thus is not up for negotiation.
4 Evidentiality and temporal distance
Having discussed the meaning contributions of the scope proposition and the ev-
idential, I now come to the most substantial part of the proposal: the content of
the evidential meaning. I argue that Bulgarian evidentials are ‘secondary tense’
morphemes which represent a temporal relation between a past learning event/a
secondary ‘now’ and the topic time. DIR signals that the speaker learned the scope
proposition before or during the topic time while IND signals that the speaker learned
the scope proposition after the topic time. Thus, DIR can be thought of as a (sec-
ondary) non-past marker and IND can be thought of as a (secondary) past marker.
The current account is quite a radical departure from standard theories of eviden-
11 Since Bulgarian evidentials do not affect the scope proposition, they could just as well be called
‘conventional implicatures’, in the sense of Potts (2005). However, doing so would also make them
a different meaning type from (indirect) evidentials in languages like Cuzco Quechua (see Faller
2002) or Cheyenne (see Murray 2010) which clearly affect the scope proposition and thus cannot be
conventional implicatures in this sense.
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tiality. Traditionally, the grammatical category of evidentiality is defined as denoting
‘evidence type’ or related concepts, e.g. ‘indication of evidence’ (Anderson 1986),
‘information source’ (Willett 1988), or ‘source of information’ (Aikhenvald 2004).
On the current account the notion of ‘evidence type’ plays no theoretical role but is
derived from the temporal position of the time of learning with respect to other parts
in the temporal structure. Simply put, evidentiality in Bulgarian signals when, not
how the scope proposition was learned. Learning events (or situations) have been
claimed to play a crucial role in the evidentiality systems of other languages too, e.g.
in Northern Ostyak (Nikolaeva 1999), Tariana (Aikhenvald 2004), Matses (Fleck
2007), Korean (Lee 2008), various languages (Speas 2010). The current account
lends further support to the aforementioned analyses.
Before going into the discussion, I provide some background on temporality.
I assume a neo-Reichenbachian temporal ontology consisting of a speech event,
a verbal event, and a topic time (also commonly called ‘reference time’).12 The
speech event is the event of the speaker’s uttering the sentence; the verbal event is
the event (or, more broadly, the eventuality) described by the sentence; the topic
time is the time to which the claim of the sentence is limited. Temporal adverbials
mark the topic time. Tense is a relation between the speech event and the topic time
while aspect is a relation between the topic time and the event time.13 I enrich this
fairly standard temporal picture by introducing a learning event, i.e. the event of the
speaker’s learning the scope proposition.
Given this temporal ontology, the two core sentences with evidentials in (1)-(2),
repeated below as (10)-(11), will receive the analysis pictorially represented below,
where es = speech event, e = verbal event, t = topic time, el = learning event.
(10) Ivan
Ivan
celu-n-a-Ø
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-DIR
Maria.
Maria
‘Ivan kissed Maria, as I learned then.’
e
• es
t ||||||| •
•
el
12 I prefer to conceive of the first two as events, not as times, for two reasons mainly. First, the presence
of a speech event enables us to easily derive related notions such as ‘speaker’ (the agent of the speech
event), ‘hearer’ (the patient of the speech event), etc. Also, introducing a speech event, a verbal event
and a learning event emphasizes certain configurational similarities across empirical domains (see
Conclusion for more on this point).
13 See Dowty (1986), Kamp & Reyle (1993) and Klein (1994) for a fuller discussion of these notions.
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(11) Ivan
Ivan
celu-n-a-l
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-IND
Maria.
Maria
‘Ivan kissed Maria, as I learned later.’
e
• es
t ||||||| •
•
el
Since both sentences are marked for past tense, the topic time precedes the speech
event in each case. These sentences are also marked with the perfective aspect, hence
the verbal event is included in the topic time. The only point of difference between
the two sentences is where the learning event is located: during the topic time (10)
or after the topic time (11).14
The temporal account may not seem very different from the received view,
according to which DIR and IND signal direct or indirect evidence type, respectively.
However, there are two types of examples in which the two views make different
predictions and thus can be distinguished. The first type of example includes cases
in which the speaker does not witness the verbal event but the topic time includes the
learning event. Consider (12). When the topic time, made explicit by the temporal
adverbial, fully precedes the learning event, only IND is possible (12a). This is as
expected on both the temporal account and the received view—according to the
latter, due to the indirect nature of the evidence. More strikingly though, when the
topic time is made bigger and includes the learning event, DIR is strongly preferred
(12b), as predicted by the temporal account.
(12) On Saturday morning Jack goes to New York. You learn about it on Saturday
afternoon, say from a mutual friend. A few days later you say:
a. V
on
sybota
Saturday
sutrin-ta
morning-DEF
Džak
Jack
#oti-de-Ø
go-3SG.PST-DIR
/
/
oti-šy-l
go-PST-IND
do
to
NY.
NY
‘On Saturday morning Jack went to New York, as I learned later.’
b. V
on
sybota
Saturday
Džak
Jack
oti-de-Ø
go-3SG.PST-DIR
/
/
??oti-šy-l
go-PST-IND
do
to
NY.
NY
‘On Saturday Jack went to New York, as I learned then.’
14 The direct evidential seems also compatible with the learning event preceding the topic time; see
example (14).
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Notice that the speaker has indirect (more precisely, reportative) evidence for her
claim in both (12a) and (12b), so recourse to ‘evidence type’ alone will not do here.
The second interesting type of example arises in cases in which the speaker
witnesses the verbal event but realizes what she has seen at a later time which
excludes the topic time. The temporal account correctly predicts that in such cases
IND is required. In (13) the whole narrative is marked with the direct evidential but
when it comes to describing what President Nixon was doing in his office, only the
indirect evidential is possible.
(13) One of Nixon’s aids vividly recalls walking into the President’s office and
seeing the President erase some tapes. A few months later she learns about
the Watergate scandal from the newspapers and makes sense of what she has
seen. When asked what happened on that day, she says:
a. Kogato
when
vljaz-ox-Ø,
enter-1SG.PST-DIR
Niskyn
Nixon
tri-e-še-Ø
erase-3SG-PST-DIR
njakav-i
some-PL
zapis-i.
tape-PL
‘When I walked in, I saw Nixon erase some tapes.’
b. A
but
toj
he
#zalicˇ-ava-še-Ø
remove-3SG-PST-DIR
/
/
zalicˇ-ava-l
remove-3SG-IND
ulik-i-te.
clue-PL-DEF.PL
‘He was covering up the clues, as I learned later.’
Again, this example cannot be explained in terms of ‘evidence type’: the speaker
has direct evidence for (13b) but has to report it with the indirect evidential.15
There are at least two significant consequences of the discussion so far. First,
it is clear that the knowledge involved is propositional, not eventive. Bulgarian
evidentials encode when the scope proposition was learned, not whether the speaker
perceived the verbal event or not. Second, the learning event is linked to the topic
time, not directly to the verbal event. This is particularly clear when Bulgarian
evidentials occur in negative sentences as in (7), which deny the existence of the
verbal event but still have a topic time. Those two consequences disqualify alternative
event-level analyses of temporal evidentials which link the speaker’s perception
directly to the verbal event (e.g. Faller 2004, Chung 2007).
I close this section with a few broader remarks on the temporal account pre-
sented above. First, I assume that the learning event always precedes the speech
event, independently of whether the topic time is in the past (as in all of the above
examples), in the present or in the future (see Section 6 on the latter cases). This is
15 Aikhenvald (2004) refers to such cases as ‘deferred realization’ and links them to mirative uses of
evidentials. Since mirative readings are typically marked by indirect evidentials/past tenses, the
puzzling nature of (13b) would be explained. However, (13b) does not seem to have the typical
attributes of mirativity: it can be uttered with a declarative intonation and the speaker could already
be aware of the content of her report.
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a plausible component of the evidential meaning as the speaker could felicitously
make an assertion only if she has acquired the asserted content in the past.
Next, the direct evidential is analyzed as a secondary non-past tense, not as a
secondary present tense. This choice is motivated by cases in which the learning
event precedes the topic time, and in which what is required is the direct evidential.
(14) Two days ago your colleague Ivan calls you and tells you that he is very sick
and will skip work the next day. As expected, yesterday he does not show up
for work. Today you say:
Vcˇera
yesterday
Ivan
Ivan
beš-e-Ø
be.PST-3SG-DIR
/
/
#bi-l
be.PST-IND
bolen.
sick
‘Yesterday Ivan was sick, as I learned before that.’
Hence, I assume that the direct evidential is underspecified between a present and a
past learning event with respect to the topic time.
The third point concerns the status of the direct evidential, analyzed here as a
phonologically null suffix. What about the possibility that DIR is not real and that
the direct evidential readings arise as a conversational implicature?16 Such a view
would predict that the unmarked structure is also compatible with the learning event
following the topic time, a prediction that is not borne out.
(15) #Vcˇera
yesterday
Ivan
Ivan
kup-i
buy-3SG.PST
nova
new
kola,
car
kakto
as
na-ucˇ-ix
PFV-learn-1SG.PST
dnes.
today
‘Yesterday Ivan bought a new car, as I learned today.’ (targeted)
Finally, learning events seem to play some limited role even in English. There
are cases in which the verbal tense targets the learning event, not the verbal event. In
(16a), the past tense in the second clause does not target some past topic time during
which John’s blood type was A-positive but rather the time at which the speaker
learned that John’s blood type is A-positive. In (16b), the future tense does not target
some future topic time during which John will be in bed but rather the (possible)
future learning event of the hearer’s walking into John’s room and finding him in
bed.
(16) a. John’s blood was drawn and tested a few weeks ago and his blood type
was A-positive. (Anna Szabolcsi via Ezra Keshet, p.c.)
b. It’s 8 p.m. and John will be in bed. (Anna Szabolcsi via Ezra Keshet, p.c.)
16 If we assume that Bulgarian evidentials are conventional implicatures (Potts 2005), then the implica-
tions triggered by the use of the unmarked form could be called ‘anti-conventional implicatures’. See
Percus (2006) for the related notion of ‘anti-presupposition’.
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The fact that learning events are also part of temporal systems of languages without
grammatical evidential marking lends further support for the current account.
5 Formal account
Following the seminal work of Stalnaker (1978), several scholars have emphasized
the idea that (at-issue) assertion is not a direct update of the context set but rather
a proposal to update the context set (e.g. Groenendijk & Roelofsen 2009, Farkas
& Bruce 2010, Murray 2010). AnderBois et al. (2010) propose to capture the
distinction between regular assertive content and assertive content contributed by
appositive by the different ways assertive content can enter the context set. Regular
assertive content is a proposal to update the context set whereas appositive content
is directly ‘imposed’ on the context set. AnderBois et al. (2010) implement this idea
in a logic that extends Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendjik & Stokhof 1991) by
adding propositional variables. Since Bulgarian evidentials share several properties
with appositive content—both meanings project and are backgrounded, neither
meaning affects the regular assertive content—I adopt their proposal, with slight
modifications.
The major innovation of AnderBois et al. (2010) is the introduction of propo-
sitional variables, interpreted as non-empty sets of worlds. This requires a model
structure that consists not only of a set of individuals D and an interpretation function
[[·]] but also a set of worlds W , disjoint from D. There are two important propositional
variables in the language: pcs (the current context set) and p (the scope proposition
representing the at-issue proposal). Atomic formulas representing lexical relations
are relativized to propositional variables by means of the following interpretation
rule.
(17) g[[Rp(x1, ...,xn)]]h iff g = h & ∀w ∈ h(p) : (h(x1), ...,h(xn)) ∈ [[R]]w
In short, atomic formulas test whether the described lexical relation holds in every
world of the proposition to which the formula is relativized.
A sentence with an appositive as in (18) will be translated as shown below.17
(18) Lance, a cyclist, won.
a. (new proposal) ∃p∧ p⊆ pcs∧
b. (assertive content) ∃x∧ x = lance∧ cyclistpcs(x)∧wonp(x)∧
c. (acceptance) ∃pcs∧ pcs = p
17 I follow AnderBois et al. (2010) in representing random assignment to variables as separate formulas,
not as part of first-order quantified formulas as in the seminal work of Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991).
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There are three important parts in the translation above (names slightly modified):
new proposal, assertive content, and acceptance. In the new proposal part, the scope
proposition is introduced as a subset of the current context set, which is anaphorically
linked to previous discourse. In the assertive content part, the descriptive part of
the sentence is presented. Importantly, regular assertive content is relativized to
the proposal proposition p whereas appositive content is relativized to the current
context set pcs and directly affects it. Finally, in the acceptance part the scope
proposition is accepted by reintroducing the context set variable and equating it
with the scope proposition.18 The difference between regular assertive content and
appositive content is in how they affect the context set. Regular assertive content is
an update proposal which can be accepted or rejected by the speech participants.19
Appositive content is backgrounded and directly restricts the context set, regardless
of whether or not the new proposal is accepted.
With this formal background in mind, we can translate example (1), repeated
below as (19), as follows.20
(19) Ivan
Ivan
celu-n-a-Ø
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-DIR
Maria.
Maria
‘Ivan kissed Maria, as I learned then.’
a. ∃p∧ p⊆ pcs∧
b. ∃x∧ x = ivan∧∃y∧ y = maria∧∃e∧ kissp(e,x,y)∧ e⊆ t ∧ t < es∧
c. ∃el ∧ LEARNpcs(el,AGENT(es), p)∧ el ≤ t ∧ el < es∧
d. ∃pcs∧ pcs = p
The new proposal introduces the scope proposition (19a). The foregrounded part
of the sentence asserts that in all worlds of the scope proposition Ivan kissed Maria
during some past topic time (19b). The evidential import is represented in (19c).
This part of the translation requires that the speaker learn the scope proposition in
all worlds of the incoming context set and that the learning event be no later than
the topic time and before the speech event. If the proposal is accepted, the scope
proposition becomes the new context set by means of (19d).
The sentence in (2), which I repeat below as (20), will receive an almost identical
translation, with the only difference that in the third line the learning event has to
18 Since the scope proposition was introduced as a subset of the old context set, the new context set will
also be a (not necessarily proper) subset of the old context set.
19 Rejecting the proposal proposition can be formally achieved by removing the acceptance part from
the logical translation of the sentence.
20 I assume that the speech event and the topic time variables are anaphorically linked to previous
discourse.
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follow the topic time. (The points of difference between the two translations are
underlined.)
(20) Ivan
Ivan
celu-n-a-l
kiss-PFV-3SG.PST-IND
Maria.
Maria
‘Ivan kissed Maria, as I learned later.’
a. ∃p∧ p⊆ pcs∧
b. ∃x∧ x = ivan∧∃y∧ y = maria∧∃e∧ kissp(e,x,y)∧ e⊆ t ∧ t < es∧
c. ∃el ∧ LEARNpcs(el,AGENT(es), p)∧ t < el ∧ el < es∧
d. ∃pcs∧ pcs = p
It should be clear by now how the proposed semantics captures the different parts
of the current account. Let us take (20) as an illustration. Due to the interpretation
rule in (17), the regular assertive content represented in (20b) will hold in each world
of the scope proposition, hence the latter will be entailed, if accepted. Since the
evidential contribution (20c) is separated from the contribution of the rest of the
sentence, it will project.21 The evidential import will also be backgrounded since it
is directly predicated of the context set, not of the scope proposition representing the
new proposal. Finally, all the temporal information is recorded in (20), as already
explained in (10)-(11) above.
6 Extensions to non-past tenses
So far the temporal account of Bulgarian evidentials was only discussed with respect
to past tense sentences. In this section I suggest how it could be extended to sentences
in non-past tenses.
I first discuss sentences in the future tense. Future tense sentences have their topic
time later than the speech event. Since the learning event always precedes the speech
event (see Section 4), the learning event will necessarily precede the topic time.
This would predict that future sentences are only possible with direct evidentials.
However, future sentences with indirect evidentials are perfectly natural in Bulgarian.
Hence, the original account needs to be modified in order to accommodate such data.
A tentative idea would be that evidential markers in Bulgarian can only target
past times, i.e. times that precede the speech event. When the topic time is non-past,
21 Negation, as defined in Groenendijk & Stokhof (1991), introduces certain complexities. It interacts
with the definition in (17) in such a way that it only requires that the lexical relation does not hold
in some of the context-set worlds, not in all such worlds. One solution would be to introduce the
positive proposition first and relativize foregrounded content to it; the scope proposition would then
be the set-theoretic difference between the context set and the positive proposition. For a different
implementation of the same idea, see Murray (2010), who builds on Bittner (2010).
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evidentials will target another topical past time, typically some salient stages of the
preparatory process of the verbal event.22 This could include the physical signs of
an upcoming event or someone’s decision to undertake a certain action. The latter
case is illustrated below. The speaker has reportative evidence for her claim in both
(21) and (22). What is different is the temporal location of Daniela’s decision to visit
Georgi tomorrow: simultaneously with the time of learning (21) or prior to it (22).
(21) Daniela discusses her plans for tomorrow with you. While talking to you she
decides to visit Georgi. You say:
Utre
tomorrow
Daniela
Daniela
šte-Ø
will-DIR
/
/
??štja-l-a
will-IND-FEM
da
PRT
poset-i
visit-3SG
Georgi.
Georgi
‘Tomorrow Daniela will visit Georgi. She decided it while talking to me.’
(22) A few days ago Daniela decides to visit Georgi tomorrow. Today, she informs
you about her plans. You say:
Utre
tomorrow
Daniela
Daniela
??šte-Ø
will-DIR
/
/
štja-l-a
will-IND-FEM
da
PRT
poset-i
visit-3SG
Georgi.
Georgi
‘Tomorrow Daniela will visit Georgi, she told me.’
If the learning event targets Daniela’s decision to visit Georgi, then the use of the
evidential markers above is predicted.
Evidentials in Bulgarian can also occur in present tense sentences. Morphologi-
cally, present tense sentences are only compatible with imperfective verbs. I assume
that in such cases evidentials target some salient stages of the ongoing eventuality. In
(23), the learning event overlaps with the stages of the rain observed by the speaker
and only DIR is possible. In (24), the learning event follows the salient stages of
the rain (which overlap with the learning event of the speaker’s friend) and IND is
strongly preferred.
(23) You are in Sofia. You look through the window and see the pouring rain. You
say:
V
in
moment-a
moment-DEF
v
in
Sofia
Sofia
val-i-Ø
rain-3SG-DIR
/
/
#val-ja-l-o.
rain-3SC-IND-NEUT
‘Right now it is raining in Sofia, I noticed.’
22 I assume the event structure of Moens & Steedman (1988) and Kamp & Reyle (1993), who distinguish
between preparatory process/phase, culmination (point), and consequent/result state.
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(24) A friend of yours gives you a call from Sofia and tells you that it is raining
there. You say:
V
in
moment-a
moment-DEF
v
in
Sofia
Sofia
??val-i-Ø
rain-3SG-DIR
/
/
val-ja-l-o.
rain-3SG-IND-NEUT
‘Right now it is raining in Sofia, someone noticed.’
The data above are explained by the assumption that the learning event targets the
stages of the rain observed by the source of the information, either the speaker
herself (23) or the speaker’s friend (24).
There are languages with temporal-like indirect evidentials that differ from
Bulgarian in that they are only used with past tenses, e.g. Cuzco Quechua (Faller
2004). It is possible that such languages also introduce learning events but such
events always target the topic time, even when the latter is non-past.
7 Conclusion and outlook
In this paper I have argued that Bulgarian evidentials entail the scope proposition,
represent projective content/backgrounded assertions, and encode the temporal
distance between the time of learning of the scope proposition and the topic time. I
also suggested how the current account can be extended to sentences with evidentials
in non-past tenses. In the remaining part of this conclusion I explore some of the
broader implications for the theory of evidentiality and other domains of linguistics.
With respect to the speaker’s commitment to the scope proposition, a new type
of (indirect) evidentials seems to emerge. First, there is the class of illocutionary-like
evidentials which imply no commitments to the scope proposition. Examples include
-si in Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002, Faller 2011), -se˙stse in Cheyenne (Murray 2010),
and soo-da in Japanese (McCready & Ogata 2007). In addition, there is the class
of modal-like evidentials. Such evidentials imply some degree of uncertainty of
the speaker with respect to the scope proposition. It has been argued in that sollen
in German (Faller 2006) and -ku7 in St’át’imcets’ (Matthewson et al. 2007) are
modal-like evidentials. Next to those two well-known classes, there seems to emerge
a third class of evidentials, i.e. evidentials that commit the speaker to the scope
proposition. I will simply call such evidentials ‘temporal-like’ evidentials. Some
examples of temporal-like evidentials are -red in Tibetan (Garrett 2001) and, on the
current analysis, -l in Bulgarian. It is an open question to what extent the property
of being a temporal evidential is cross-linguistically correlated with the property of
entailing the scope proposition.
Another point concerns some configurational similarities across grammatical
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domains.23 Reichenbach (1947) famously distinguished between three times in
the temporal ontology of English: a speech point (the time of utterance), an event
point (the time during which the verbal eventuality holds), and a reference point
(roughly, my topic time from above). Stone (1997) argues that the same tripartite
structure is found in the modal domain of English. Stone introduces three scenarios
(or possibilities): a speech scenario (the current information of the speaker), an event
scenario (the scenario described by the sentence), and a reference scenario (some
contextually salient scenario) and directly links these to the speech point, the event
point, and the reference point, respectively. If the analysis presented above is on the
right track, there are three events involved in the eventuality system of Bulgarian
and, possibly, various other typologically unrelated languages: a speech event (the
event of the speaker uttering the sentence), a verbal event (the event described by
the verb phrase), and a learning event (the event of the speaker’s learning the scope
proposition). The way these events are linked to the three temporal points introduced
by Reichenbach was already described above.
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